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INTRODUCTION
In Salinas v Texas,1 the Supreme Court eroded what little
remained of the Fifth Amendment jurisprudence protecting
against coercive police questioning of suspects. The result en-
courages precisely the types of informal, undocumented ques-
tioning that can cause false confessions and wrongful convic-
tions. A majority of the Justices held that a person's silence in
response to a question asked before any arrest or placement in
custody can be used as evidence of guilt at trial.2 A suspect can-
not simply remain silent, but must in an unexplained manner
(only a plurality discussed the point) explicitly invoke a Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent, without ever having been in-
formed of one's rights following the Court's landmark ruling in
Miranda v Arizona.3
The Miranda ruling-requiring the police to give a suspect
the well-known warnings that "have become part of our national
culture," prior to a custodial interrogation, or risk suppression of
any confession statements-had already been badly eroded, alt-
hough the Court affirmed the constitutional stature of the ruling
in Dickerson v United States4 in 2000.5 Over the past four dec-
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1 133 S Ct 2174 (2013).
2 Id at 2180 (plurality), 2184 (Thomas concurring).
3 384 US 436 (1966); Salinas, 133 S Ct at 2180.
4 530 US 428 (2000).
5 Id at 443. For scholarship discussing the "erosion" of Miranda, see, for example,
Leslie A. Lunney, The Erosion of Miranda: Stare Decisis Consequences, 48 Cath U L Rev
727, 745-86 (1999); Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular
Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 Georgetown L J 1, 24 (2010) ("Miranda has effec-
tively been overruled."); Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 Cal L Rev 1519,
1521 (2008) ("Miranda is largely dead. It is time to 'pronounce the body,' as they say on
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ades, the Court limited Miranda's reach in a death-by-a-
thousand-cuts accretion of rulings. These rulings include: find-
ing a public safety exception,6 an exception for questioning by
covert or undercover officers,7 and an exception for questioning
during routine booking;8 holding there is no civil recourse for a
violation;9 permitting police to renew questioning if the suspect
initiates further discussion or after the passage of time;o requir-
ing that a suspect use precise language to invoke the right;"
permitting police to use the "fruits" of non-Mirandized state-
ments; 12 and permitting impeachment use of statements ob-
tained in violation of Miranda.13 Most recently, in its 2010 ruling
in Berghuis u Thompkins,14 the Court held that prolonged silence
after being given the Miranda warnings was not sufficient to in-
voke their protection.15
Of what importance is the new Salinas exception, added to
that litany of rulings that sharply narrowed if not "stealth over-
ruled" Miranda?16 Indeed, where the vast majority of suspects
readily waive Miranda rights, and where police are trained to
provide Miranda warnings in a manner that encourages ready
waiver, even perfect compliance with Miranda may not prevent
coercion during an interrogation or contamination of false con-
fessions.17 Moreover, the Court has separately done much to
television, and move on."); Yale Kamisar, The Rise, Decline, and Fall (?) of Miranda, 87
Wash L Rev 965, 984 (2012) (identifying the "piece-by-piece 'overruling' of Miranda").
6 See New York u Quarles, 467 US 649, 653 (1984).
7 See Illinois u Perkins, 496 US 292, 294 (1990).
8 See Pennsylvania v Muniz, 496 US 582, 601-02 (1990).
9 See Chavez u Martinez, 538 US 760, 766-73 (2003).
10 See Edwards u Arizona, 451 US 477, 485 (1981); Michigan u Mosley, 423 US 96,
107 (1975); Oregon u Bradshaw, 462 US 1039, 1043-44 (1983); Oregon u Elstad, 470 US
298, 310 (1985); Missouri u Seibert, 542 US 600, 611 (2004) (plurality).
I See Connecticut u Barrett, 479 US 523, 527-30 (1987).
12 United States u Patane, 542 US 630, 636-37 (2004).
13 Harris u New York, 401 US 222, 226 (1971); Oregon u Hass, 420 US 714, 722-23
(1975).
14 130 S Ct 2250 (2010).
15 See id at 2259-60.
16 Friedman, 99 Georgetown L J at 16 (cited in note 5).
17 See Saul M. Kassin, et al, Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recom-
mendations, 34 L & Human Beh 3, 23 (2010) (" [I]t is clear that Miranda warnings may
not adequately protect the citizens who need it most-those accused of crimes they did
not commit."); Richard J. Ofshe and Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Ra-
tional Choice and Irrational Action, 74 Denver U L Rev 979, 1119 (1997). Innocent peo-
ple may be particularly likely to waive Miranda rights. See Saul M. Kassin, On the Psy-
chology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?, 60 Am Psych 215, 223-24
(2005).
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erode the limited protections of its highly deferential voluntari-
ness jurisprudence.18
Even in that badly eroded landscape, the Salinas decision
has practical importance and troubling corrosive power. The
Court's rulings have long emphasized "coercion inherent in cus-
todial interrogation" which can "blur[] the line between volun-
tary and involuntary statements."19 The Salinas decision further
encourages police to blur the line between a custodial and non-
custodial interrogation. Police interrogate adult suspects some-
what infrequently, chiefly in serious criminal cases like homi-
cides in which confession evidence is critical to closing the case.
But police interact and question people on the beat in all sorts of
varied everyday contexts. To be sure, the Court had already nar-
rowed the interpretation of the "custody" requirement of Miran-
da in the circumstances in which a suspect was not under a
"formal arrest," even when questioned at a police station.20 As a
result of the Salinas ruling, those routine police interactions can
be used to secure admissible evidence if a person does not re-
spond to a solitary question.
Still more troubling, the Court's ruling encourages police to
question suspects in informal settings that not only lack clear
rules, but are not documented and therefore prone to the dan-
gers of confession contamination.21 1 will develop why the very
type of questioning at issue in Salinas poses special risks of elic-
iting false information from innocent suspects, and why police
and policymakers should continue to vigilantly resist unsound
interrogation practices that the Court appears to embrace.
I. THE SALINAS CASE
Two brothers were shot and killed at their home in Houston,
Texas, on the morning of December 18, 1992.22 Although a
neighbor saw a person run out of the house and drive off in a
dark-colored car after hearing shots fired, there were no eyewit-
nesses to the murder itself. The police did find six shotgun shell
18 See Colorado u Connelly, 479 US 157, 168 (1986). See also Brandon L. Garrett,
The Substance of False Confessions, 62 Stan L Rev 1051, 1109-12 (2010).
19 Dickerson, 530 US at 435.
20 See Beckwith u United States, 425 US 341, 347 (1976); Oregon u Mathiason, 429
US 492, 495 (1977); California v Beheler, 463 US 1121, 1124-25 (1983).
21 Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go
Wrong 14-44 (Harvard 2011).
22 Salinas, 133 S Ct at 2178.
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casings at the scene. 23 The police learned that a man named
Genovevo Salinas had been at a party at the victims' house the
night before the murders.24 As part of their investigation, police
then visited Salinas' home.25 There they found a dark-colored car
parked outside and Salinas himself, who readily spoke to the po-
lice and cooperated, including by giving the police his father's
shotgun.26 The police then asked Salinas to accompany them to
the station for further questioning, and he agreed. They ques-
tioned him at the station for about one hour.27 During this time,
the police did not arrest Salinas, and as a result, they did not
read him the well-known Miranda warnings.28
Although Salinas was questioned at a police station, all
sides in the litigation apparently agreed that questioning con-
sisted in a noncustodial interview. Was that correct? Was this a
noncustodial interrogation? The Court in Miranda defined a cus-
todial interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."29 How-
ever, the Court subsequently limited its definition of custody to
a "formal arrest" or something akin to that.30 Further, an "inter-
rogation" requires more than just placing a person in custody,
but also some additional compulsion through "express question-
ing," or its "functional equivalent" which includes "any words or
actions . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."31 The Court
in Rhode Island v Innis32 had previously found that questioning
in a police car using a "few offhand remarks" was not the kind of
"lengthy harangue" that counts as an interrogation.33
The critical moment during the questioning at the police
station related to the six shotgun casings found at the crime
scene. The police asked Salinas "whether his shotgun 'would
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Salinas, 133 S Ct at 2178.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Miranda, 384 US at 444.
30 Beheler, 463 US at 1125 (limiting the definition of "custody" to '"formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest"), quot-
ing Mathiason, 429 US at 495.
31 Rhode Island u Innis, 446 US 291, 301 (1980).
32 446 US 291 (1980).
33 Id at 303
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match the shells recovered at the scene of the murder."'34 Obvi-
ously, if he had said "yes," the answer would have been highly
incriminating. However, according to the testimony of the police
at his trial, Salinas did not answer the question. He stopped
talking.35 The officer described his body language after being
asked that question as follows: Salinas "[1]ooked down at the
floor, shuffled his feet, bit his bottom lip, cl[e]nched his hands in
his lap, [and] began to tighten up."36
Salinas had not been told that he had a right to remain si-
lent. But he did remain silent. And after a "few moments of si-
lence," police changed the subject and asked other questions
that Salinas did answer. 37 Police then released him. Prosecutors
concluded they lacked sufficient evidence to charge him with the
murders, and did not file charges until a few days later, after
the police obtained a statement from a man who said he over-
heard Salinas confessing.38 The murder case went to trial years
later. (Salinas had gone into hiding.39)
At his criminal trial, Salinas did not testify. However, the
jury heard police and prosecutors describe how he had been si-
lent, accompanied by reportedly uncomfortable body language,
after he was asked about whether his shotgun would match the
shells recovered. There was no video or record of the police ques-
tioning. The officer at trial said, "it's been a long time ago and
there's a lot of details about this case and many other cases in
between that," making it hard to remember everything that
happened.40 And although police, like this officer, can place spe-
cial emphasis on nonverbal cues by suspects, research shows
that such supposed clues do not in fact provide reliable evidence
of truthfulness or guilt.41 Nevertheless, jurors may tend to be-
lieve that there are telltale signs of a liar. And the prosecutor
told the jury, for example, that "' [a]n innocent person' would
have said, 'What are you talking about? I didn't do that. I wasn't
34 Salinas, 133 S Ct at 2178, quoting Joint Appendix, Salinas u Texas, No 12-246,
*17 (US filed Feb 20, 2013) (available on Westlaw at 2013 WL 634511) ("Joint Appen-
dix").
35 Salinas, 133 S Ct at 2178.
36 Id (brackets in original), quoting Joint Appendix at *18.
37 Salinas, 133 S Ct at 2178.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Joint Appendix at *10.
41 See Saul M. Kassin, Human Judges of Truth, Deception, and Credibility: Confi-
dent but Erroneous, 23 Cardozo L Rev 809, 809-17 (2002); Aldert Vrij, Detecting Lies and
Deceit: Pitfalls and Opportunities 142-51 (Wiley 2d ed 2008).
120 [80:116
Remaining Silent after Salinas
there."'42 Salinas argued this violated his Fifth Amendment
rights.43
II. THE SALINAS DECISION
The Salinas decision lacked a majority ruling on what
words must be used to invoke one's Fifth Amendment rights
during noncustodial questioning by the police. What is definitive
about the Salinas ruling, and what did garner five votes, is that
silence during noncustodial questioning may draw an adverse
inference at a trial. Justice Samuel Alito wrote the plurality de-
cision, explaining that since Salinas was "free to leave at any
time during the interview," he would have had to verbally assert
his right to remain silent.44 While Salinas did remain silent
when answering the question at issue, in Justice Alito's view, he
should have "expressly invoke[d]" his Fifth Amendment rights,
rather than "standing mute."45 Justice Alito highlighted that
nothing deprived Salinas of the opportunity to voluntarily in-
voke those rights. Of course, he had not been informed of his
rights by the police. However, Justice Alito concluded that "it
would have been a simple matter for him to say that he was not
answering the officer's question on Fifth Amendment grounds."46
It was not clear whether the plurality would require a suspect to
invoke the Fifth Amendment itself, or what language would be
required to do so short of referring to the specific constitutional
right. Although the plurality noted the concern raised that there
could be ongoing litigation over "what a suspect must say to in-
voke the privilege," the plurality nevertheless declined to pro-
vide further guidance.47
Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Antonin Scalia wrote
separately, and they did not shed any light on how a suspect
should invoke Fifth Amendment rights. Instead, they briefly
stated their position that Griffin u California48 was wrongly de-
cided, and that the Fifth Amendment does not "prohibit[] a
42 Salinas, 133 S Ct at 2185 (Breyer dissenting) (brackets in original), quoting Sa-
linas v Texas, 368 SW3d 550, 556 (Tex App 2011).
43 Salinas 133 S Ct at 2178 (majority).
44 Id at 2180, quoting Brief for Petitioner, Salinas u Texas, No 12-246, *2-3 (US
filed Jan 20, 2013) (available on Westlaw at 2013 WL 633595).
45 Salinas, 133 S Ct at 2179, 2181.
46 Id at 2180.
47 Id at 2183.
48 380 US 609 (1965).
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prosecutor or judge from commenting on a defendant's failure to
testify."49
In Berghuis u Thompkins, the Court had previously ad-
dressed a custodial interrogation in which a suspect received the
Miranda warnings, and then remained silent during two and
three-quarter hours of questioning.50 The Berghuis Court held
that remaining silent in that fashion during a custodial interro-
gation was insufficient to invoke the protections of the Fifth
Amendment.51 As Justice Breyer pointed out in his Salinas dis-
sent, that case dealt with the later speech of the suspect, and in
that case "[t]he Court said nothing at all about a prosecutor's
right to comment on his preceding silence and no prosecutor
sought to do so."52 Justice Breyer emphasized, "how could a
prosecutor lawfully have tried to do so" in the Berghuis case,
"given this Court's statement in Miranda itself that a prosecutor
cannot comment on the fact that, after receiving Miranda warn-
ings, the suspect 'stood mute'?"53
To be sure, the Court had previously required a suspect to
use clear language to invoke the right,54 although Miranda had
warned against a rule that "would discriminate against ... the
very defendant who most needs counsel."55 In contrast, waiver of
the right could be inferred from the circumstances (as in
Berghuis, in which waiver was inferred from maintaining silence
during two and three-quarters hours of police questioning) and
did not require any explicit statement by the suspect.56
Although the Salinas plurality stated that its result flowed
from Berghuis,57 as noted, that case involved the situation in
which the suspect was in custody, and in which there was at
least arguably a waiver of the Miranda right. Salinas involved a
suspect who concededly was not in custody and voluntarily ac-
companied police to the police station. (Whether such a person
would really feel free to leave is another question.) But Salinas
did not waive any rights, because Salinas was not given them.
49 Salinas, 133 S Ct at 2184-85 (Thomas concurring).
50 Berghuis, 130 S Ct at 2259.
51 See id at 2259-60.
52 Salinas, 133 S Ct at 2189 (Breyer dissenting).
53 Id (Breyer dissenting), quoting Miranda, 384 US at 468 n 37.
54 Connecticut u Barrett, 479 US 523, 527-30 (1987).
55 Miranda, 384 US at 471, quoting People v Dorado, 398 P2d 361, 369-70 (Cal
1965).
56 Berghuis, 130 S Ct at 2262.
57 Salinas, 133 S Ct at 2182.
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Salinas was also a remarkable extension of the Court's prior
ruling in Jenkins v Anderson8 that pre-arrest conduct could be
used for impeachment at trial.5> While the plurality in Salinas
purported to rely on Jenkins, that case involved someone who
was never questioned by police, who therefore had no occasion to
decide whether he was invoking privilege; rather, in that case,
the prosecutor commented on the defendant's failure to turn
himself in.60 In contrast, Salinas was questioned at a police sta-
tion. After Salinas, people must invoke the right to remain si-
lent even when they are not formal suspects, being formally
questioned, and when they have not heard the Miranda warn-
ings. This is not remotely realistic. We should not be reassured
by the plurality assurance that it would have been a "simple
matter" to assert Fifth Amendment rights under such circum-
stances.61
In dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer argued, "it was obvious
that the new question sought to ferret out whether [Mr.] Salinas
was guilty of murder."62 Moreover, the Salinas rule places a sus-
pect in an "impossible predicament."63 The suspect must either
answer the question and potentially incriminate herself, or re-
main silent, which may be used negatively at trial.
Perhaps sophisticated and well-advised suspects might
know to assert their Fifth Amendment rights outside of custody.
But as Professor Tracey Maclin put it in the context of waiver of
Fourth Amendment rights, "very few persons will have the mox-
ie to assert their [ ] rights in the face of police authority."64 Or as
Justice William Brennan put it in his dissent in Oregon v El-
stad,65 this is "marble-palace psychoanalysis."66 For those who
are more sophisticated, "after Salinas, potential targets of white
collar investigations should be especially sensitive to the risks of
58 447 US 231 (1980).
59 Id at 240.
60 Id at 233-34. Justice Breyer in his dissent describes this well, as well as why
other cases relied upon by the Salinas plurality were inapposite. See Salinas, 133 S Ct
at 2187-88 (Breyer dissenting).
61 Salinas, 133 S Ct at 2180 (majority).
62 Id at 2189 (Breyer dissenting).
63 Id at 2186 (Breyer dissenting).
64 Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment
on the Streets, 75 Cornell L Rev 1258, 1306 (1990).
65 470 US 298 (1985).
66 Id at 324 (Brennan dissenting).
2013] 123
The University of Chicago Law Review Dialogue
cooperating with any government inquiry without counsel."67 For
those less sophisticated, Salinas may similarly make members
of the community more fearful of cooperating with the police,
lest an uncomfortable look or gesture or silence be interpreted as
a guilty gesture or an incriminating silence.
III. INFORMAL QUESTIONING AND FALSE CONFESSIONS
Justice Breyer's opinion brought up another danger: if the
suspect is not silent, but "answers the question, he may well re-
veal, for example, prejudicial facts, disreputable associates, or
suspicious circumstances-even if he is innocent."68 The Salinas
ruling, as Justice Breyer indicates, creates a catch-22 situation,
posing special dangers for the innocent suspect. Informal or non-
custodial questioning is often not carefully documented by po-
lice, just as in the Salinas case itself. As a result, such informal
questioning poses special dangers that false confessions may re-
sult, even unintentionally, and may prove very difficult to un-
cover after the fact.
The danger of confession contamination is particular great
during undocumented police questioning. Confession contamina-
tion refers to the situation in which police, even inadvertently,
disclose key facts during questioning, so that not only may an
innocent person falsely confess, but that innocent person may
parrot back details that make a false confession seem uncannily
corroborated and accurate.69 I do not mean to express here any
view on whether or not Salinas was guilty or not of the two
murders. However, the cases of people who we do know are in-
nocent, with the benefit of postconviction DNA testing, provide
powerful concrete examples that illustrate just how confession
contamination can occur and how insidious such contamination
can become. I wrote a book examining the first 250 DNA ex-
67 Kirk Ogrosky, Murad Hussain, and Charles B. Weinograd, Silence As Evidence:
U.S. Supreme Court Holds That the Fifth Amendment Does Not Bar Using a Suspect's
Silence as Evidence of Guilt *4 (Arnold & Porter LLP June 21, 2013), online at
http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/ADVSalinasvTexas.pdf (visited Sept
22, 2013).
68 Salinas, 133 S Ct at 2186. See also United States u Hale, 422 US 171, 181 (1975)
(Burger concurring) ("It is no more accurate than to say, for example, that the innocent,
rather than the guilty, are the first to protest their innocence. There is simply no basis
for declaring a generalized probability one way or the other.").
69 Laura H. Nirider, Joshua A. Tepfer, and Steven A. Drizin, Book Review, Combat-
ing Contamination in Confession Cases, 79 U Chi L Rev 837, 847 (2012).
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onerees, and 40 of those innocent people had falsely confessed.70
(There have now been 59 false cases of confessions in the first
300 DNA exonerations.71) Some had supposedly admitted their
guilt by making statements to the police before there was any
custodial interrogation.
A case in point is that of Nicholas Yarris, who spent twenty
years in prison, after having been convicted and sentenced to
death in Pennsylvania. A woman had been found raped, beaten,
and stabbed a half mile from her car, a Chrysler Cordoba. Police
said that when they initially questioned Yarris, during an un-
documented session that was not considered custodial, he had
volunteered two key pieces of information. The first was that he
knew the victim had been raped. The second was still more de-
tailed: that the victim's Chrysler had a brown "landau" roof (or a
vinyl faux-convertible-type roof).72 The police said that they had
kept all such details out of the press, following standard investi-
gative practice. As a detective testified at Yarris's trial: "This is
one of the things we decided to keep confidential in the investi-
gation from the press."73 As is typical during such a noncustodial
interview, there was no recording of the questioning in which
those details were allegedly volunteered (although the detectives
proceeded to record their subsequent interrogation of Yarris).
The detectives did not provide any notes or written statements
taken to document that noncustodial interview either. However,
those two details provided crucial evidence at trial that Yarris
70 Garrett, Convicting the Innocent at 18-19 (cited in note 21).
71 This data is on file with the author, and is in the process of being updated with
detailed information about each false confession. Perhaps it should be surprising that
there would be so many false confessions, nineteen of the fifty cases, in the more recent
DNA exonerations, but the increasingly confession-heavy makeup of DNA exonerations
may be explained by a series of cases in which exonerations were substantially delayed
where prosecutors were highly reluctant to concede innocence in the face of DNA tests,
due to the fact that the defendant had confessed. See, for example, Andrew Martin, The
Prosecution's Case Against DNA, NY Times Magazine 44, 46 (Nov 27, 2011) (describing
how the three-page confession statement of Juan Rivera led to his conviction at three
different trials, including at a third trial that occurred after DNA tests had excluded
him).
72 See Garrett, 62 Stan L Rev at 1078 (cited in note 18); Brandon L. Garrett, You
Don't Have the Right to Remain Silent, Slate (June 19, 2013), online at
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/jurisprudence/2013/06/salinas v texas r
ight to remain silent supreme court right to remain silent.html (visited Sept 22,
2013); Pennsylvania v Yarris, 549 A2d 513, 520 (Pa 1988).
73 Trial Transcript, Commonwealth v Yarris, No 690-82 (Pa Ct Common Pleas June
29, 1982) (on file with author).
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knew the kind of inside information that only the killer could
have known.74
In 2003, DNA tests on several pieces of biological evidence
from the crime cleared Yarris, and he was freed and exonerat-
ed.75 We now know that Yarris's confession was likely contami-
nated, since as an innocent man not privy to information kept
confidential during this murder investigation, he could not have
known about the two key details.
Other troubling exonerations involved the same question-
first tactics and undocumented interrogations that supposedly
produced telling details volunteered by the suspects. The Bruce
Godschalk case involved a taped interrogation, but the detective
claimed that Godschalk had volunteered a series of nonpublic
facts in an initial conversation before the recording was made.76
The Marty Tankleff case, a non-DNA exoneration, presents a
slightly different example in which courts found permissible re-
suming an interrogation after an initial questioning that was
non-Mirandized.77 One of the defendants in the well-known Cen-
tral Park Jogger case claimed never to have confessed at all dur-
ing initial interviewing that was not videotaped or documented,
but a detective claimed that his notes reflected an inculpatory
statement.78 Of course, even if Salinas had come out the other
way, police might still take advantage of supposedly unsolicited
admissions; in a series of troubling cases innocent convicts were
also said to have volunteered incriminating information.79
The crucial reform to prevent contamination of confessions
is to ensure that the entire interrogation is videotaped. A clear
record of who said what and when during interrogations can
help to prevent wrongful convictions. But rules requiring detec-
tives to produce such a record of interrogations are subverted if
police who are required to videotape custodial interrogations are
encouraged to question first in noncustodial and undocumented
settings.
74 For the trial testimony concerning the confession, see Brandon Garrett, False
Confessions: Transcripts and Testimony, Library (University of Virginia School of Law),
online at http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/librarysite/garrett-falseconfess.htm (visited
Oct 9, 2013).
75 See Nicholas Yarris, The National Registry of Exonerations (University of Michi-
gan Law School), online at http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/
casedetail.aspxcaseid=3771 (visited Oct 9, 2013).
76 Garrett, 62 Stan L Rev at 1081 (cited in note 18).
77 Tankleff u Senkowski, 135 F3d 235, 242-46 (2d Cir 1998).
78 Garrett, 62 Stan L Rev at 1084 (cited in note 18).
79 Id at 1106-07.
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CONCLUSION
Salinas is like the Terry v Ohio8o of the law of confessions,
giving police such broad discretion in their less-formal work that
criminal procedure protections ostensibly applicable during
more formal actions become all the more irrelevant.81 One pur-
pose of the Miranda ruling was "to give concrete constitutional
guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow."82
The Salinas ruling does the opposite, like the litany of rulings
dating back to the 1970s that have gradually whittled away at
Miranda. Perhaps scholars and amici could have better alerted
the Justices to the implications of this ruling. The media did not
react with any particular degree of concern to the Salinas rul-
ing. 83 Then again, perhaps scholars and amici assumed there
was little hope that the Court would do anything to breathe life
into what remains of Miranda. In the years ahead, however, Sa-
linas may play a particularly troubling role in interactions be-
tween police and citizens, and not because of the way it weak-
ened Miranda, but rather because of the way the Court tacitly
encouraged police to question first outside of custody.
Police may have broad power to stop and frisk citizens un-
der Terry, but they may also restrain use of that discretion for
fear of community outrage, including over racial profiling. Simi-
lar restraint may come into play in the context of police ques-
tioning, if communities increasingly fear cooperating with the
police. Then again, people may assume that those who speak to
police and say something inculpatory are guilty. False confes-
sions come to light years later only in rare cases where postcon-
viction evidence of innocence, like DNA tests, can be obtained.
But are those who remain uncomfortably silent during informal
questioning necessarily guilty?
The Salinas ruling may have a range of consequences that
undermine criminal investigations as well as the rights of the
accused. After the Supreme Court's decision in Salinas, lawyers
may counsel suspects not to speak to the police at all. In con-
80 392 US 1 (1968).
81 See id at 20-22. For criticism of the Court's balancing approach in Terry, see, for
example, Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts about First Principles, 107 Harv L Rev 820,
855 (1994); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mis-
chief of Camara and Terry, 72 Minn L Rev 383, 401-04, 418-20 (1988).
82 Arizona v Roberson, 486 US 675, 680 (1988), quoting Miranda, 384 US at 441-
42.
83 See Garrett, You Don't Have the Right to Remain Silent (cited in note 72).
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trast, for the unsophisticated suspect, any conversation with the
police may be a highly fraught encounter. Returning to the
catch-22 that the Salinas decision creates, an "impossible pre-
dicament,"84 as Justice Breyer put it, suppose Salinas had an-
swered the question posed about the shotgun casings by ex-
claiming, "I tell you, I am innocent!" Could police testify at trial
that his exclamation rang false or was unconvincing? Suppose
Salinas had simply answered the question, "No, they couldn't
match my father's shotgun." Could police nevertheless assert
that he paused or fidgeted or looked uncomfortable while mak-
ing an exculpatory comment? As noted, although police often
place particular emphasis on nonverbal cues when questioning
suspects, social science research shows that such nonverbal
clues are not diagnostic of truthfulness or guilt.85 Moreover, in
the Salinas case, there was no evidence like a video that docu-
mented that Salinas in fact gave some appearance of being un-
comfortable when asked about the shotgun.
The Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination
are obviously most critical when police interrogate suspects, giv-
en the inherent coercive power of the police when using modern
psychological questioning tactics. Police conduct interrogations
in the most serious and high-profile criminal cases, often in
homicides, in which there are no eyewitnesses or highly proba-
tive forensic evidence. The pressure to secure a confession in
such cases can be intense. However, police also question sus-
pects far more routinely without conducting formal interroga-
tions. As in Terry, the Justices may have been uncomfortable
limiting police discretion to questioning informally, particularly
in the range of situations that may arise outside the station-
house.
However, it is in precisely that kind of undocumented ques-
tioning that we should worry about the problem of contamina-
tion. As a result of the Supreme Court's tolerance of a questions-
first, rights-later approach, police have more incentives to in-
formally question suspects with an eye to a confession. The re-
sult encourages police to question suspects without the protec-
tions that more and more departments have adopted precisely to
prevent false and contaminated confessions. More departments
now videotape entire interrogations, an inexpensive reform that
84 Salinas, 133 S Ct at 2186 (Breyer dissenting).
85 See Kassin, 23 Cardozo L Rev at 809-17 (cited in note 41); Aldert Vrij, Detecting
Lies and Deceit at 142-51 (cited in note 41).
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both carefully documents sound, professionally conducted inter-
rogations, and can help to identify situations in which a confes-
sion was contaminated. Without a complete record of an entire
interrogation, the confession cannot be easily evaluated for its
reliability. Unless it is a rare case in which DNA testing can be
done, or other powerful independent evidence is uncovered,
there may be no way to know whether the confession was true or
false.
Hopefully, the mounting numbers of states and local juris-
dictions that have already reformed their interrogation practic-
es, despite decades of steadily weakened Miranda and voluntar-
iness jurisprudence, will continue to improve the way they take
confessions.86 The Supreme Court's stealth overruling of Miran-
da may render the Court's thinning jurisprudence increasingly
irrelevant. A bare majority of the Justices may be indifferent to
the problem of false confessions, but criminal justice actors on
the ground do not have that luxury. They have increasingly
learned the hard way that wrongful convictions result from tol-
erating unreliable interrogation practices. While the Supreme
Court's Fifth Amendment jurisprudence continues to erode, the
real safeguards of the integrity of confession evidence are being
built up on the ground.
86 See Garrett, Convicting the Innocent at 247-48 (cited in note 21) (describing
state and local interrogation reforms).
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